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1The Palestinian Right to Exploit the Dead Sea Coastline for Tourism
Marco Longobardo*
Abstract
Scholars in the past decades have paid little attention to the exploitation of the Dead Sea 
coastline for tourism purposes. The Dead Sea’s Israeli and Jordanian shores are famous touristic 
attractions at the basis of quickly expanding industry. In contrast, the Palestinian portion of 
Dead Sea coastline is not exploited for tourism; it falls into the so-called Area C of the West 
Bank, where the government of Israel maintains total control and construction permits for 
tourism-related investments have been constantly denied to Palestinian investors. The present 
essay aims to analyse the Palestinian right to exploit the Dead Sea coastline in light of the 
relevant international law framework, based on international humanitarian law, on the principles 
of self-determination of peoples, and of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
Moreover, the situation will be evaluated in light of the Oslo accords, which embody provisions 
regarding the Palestinian Dead Sea exploitation. The result of the analysis is that, according to 
international law, Palestinian investors have the right to exploit the Dead Sea coastline, which 
falls into the West Bank. Israel, as an Occupying Power, cannot deny the Palestinians access 
to their coastline, and its current policy rises to the level of an international wrongful 
act. 
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2But, Father, here was a people  
rooted in its land, 
and land it is not for God to give,
but for hunger and love to have it.1
Roberto Vecchioni, Shalom 
I. Introduction
The management of fresh water sources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has been 
extensively debated among scholars in the past few decades and it is widely considered 
one of the most complex issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.2 Because all 
human beings have to drink, cook and wash, water sources are indispensable for living; 
accordingly, as stated by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ General Comment no. 15,3 there is room to argue about the existence 
of a human right to water,4 a right that is enjoyed also by civilian populations during 
armed conflicts.5
This essay will focus on an issue related to the use of a water source in Palestine, long 
untreated in the literature: the Dead Sea. Scant attention has been paid to the rules about 
the exploitation of the Dead Sea waters and coastlines, which can ease human needs in a 
number of ways: Dead Sea waters are neither drinkable nor suitable for agricultural uses 
due to their salinity, but the Dead Sea’s Israeli and Jordanian shores attract many 
tourists every year, fuelling a rich industry in both countries. On the other hand, the 
Palestinian portion of Dead Sea coastline is not exploited for touristic reasons, since it 
falls into a part of the West Bank where the government of Israel maintains total control 
over both civil and military administration, resulting in construction permits for 
tourism-related investments being systematically denied to Palestinians. 
This essay will analyse the Palestinian right to exploit the Dead Sea coastline, in light of 
the relevant international law framework, especially through the lens of the international 
rules on belligerent occupation. According to these rules, the Occupying Power must 
take all the measures available to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
civil life. Consequently, there is room to argue that Israel must guarantee a sustainable 
1
 These lines are from the song ‘Shalom’ of the Italian singer-songwriter Roberto Vecchioni (Il lanciatore 
di coltelli, 2002) (author’s trans.). The original text is: “Ma Padre, qui c’era un popolo piantato nella terra, 
e la terra non può darla Dio, ma la fame e l’amore di averla”.
2
 Among others, see Iain Scobbie, H2O After Oslo II: Legal Aspects of Water in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Palestine Yearbook of International Law (PYBIL) 8 (1994–1995), 79; Laurent Calligé (ed.), De 
l’eau et de la paix: conflit et coopération israélo-palestiniens (2008); Amanda Chill Ripley, The Human 
Right to Water and Its Application in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2011).  
3
 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ General Comment no. 15:  The 
Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), 20 January 2003, UN Doc.  E/C.12/2002/11.
4
 See, generally, Inga T. Winkler, The Human Right to Water: Significance, Legal Status and Implications 
for Water Allocation (2012).
5
 See, recently, Mara Tignino, L’eau et la guerre: éléments pour un régime juridique (2011). 
3economic development of the West Bank, allowing Palestinian investors to exploit the 
Dead Sea coastline for touristic ends. 
Moreover, the role of the principles of self-determination of peoples and of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources will be examined. It will be argued that the 
Palestinian people have not lost the right to use the natural resources of their land due to 
the prolonged Israeli occupation, even if the Israeli belligerent occupation restricts the 
exercise of this right, and that today the State of Palestine is entitled to exercise its 
rights on the Dead Sea coastline. In addition, other international treaty law norms will 
be taken in account, such as those of the human rights conventions ratified by Israel and 
of the Oslo accords.
The result of the analysis is that Palestinian people, today through the State of Palestine, 
have the right to exploit the Palestine’s Dead Sea coastline under both international 
customary and treaty law. 
II. The Situation of the Dead Sea Coastlines: An Overview
The Dead Sea is a salt lake bordered by Jordan, Palestine and Israel. It lies in the Jordan 
Rift Valley and the Jordan River is its main tributary. The Dead Sea is famous for being 
the Earth’s lowest elevation on land, the deepest hyper-saline lake on Earth and one of 
the world’s saltiest bodies of water. Such a high percentage of salt obviously prevents 
the flourishing of fish and other animals, accounting for the lake’s name.6 
The level of the water has constantly reduced in recent years, due to the 
overexploitation of the water of the Jordan River Basin; this exploitation, though, is 
essential for agriculture and farming in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.7 However, 
these States’ overexploitation endangers the delicate environmental balance of the Dead 
Sea, while at the same time the decrease in the water level causes the emergence of new 
elevations that were covered by the water before.8 The mining of Dead Sea mud, rich in 
minerals with extraordinary curative effects, is a secondary source of danger for the 
Dead Sea ecosystem because the evaporation of the Dead Sea water is part of the 
extracting process and polluting chemical products are used in same the process.9
The Palestinian Dead Sea coastline is part of the West Bank, one of the main areas of 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).10 
6
 See, generally, Dead Sea, Encyclopedia Britannica, available at: (last updated 26 November 2014). 
7
 See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Shrinking Dead Sea and the Red-Dead Canal: A Sisyphean Tale?, 
Global Business and Development Law Journal 19 (2006), 259, 259 et seq. On the legal regime of the 
Jordan Basin, see George Pring/Donald E. Frick, Jordan River, MPEPIL, available via:  
www.mpepil.com.
8
 See Al-Haq, Pillage of the Dead Sea: Israel’s Unlawful Exploitation of Natural Resources in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (2012), 23. 
9
 Ibid., 23 et seq.
10
 This expression commonly refers to all the areas that were under the expired British Mandate from 
1920 to 1948 and which are not included within the Israeli territory. The international community 
4 Since 1967, the Palestinian Dead Sea shore has been under Israeli control and 
administration, a situation that did not cease with the Oslo accords, a number of 
agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.11 According to the 
terms of these agreements, the Palestinian Dead Sea shore and the surrounding land are 
situated in the so-called Area C, and, therefore, are under total Israeli military and 
administrative control.12 The partition of the West Bank in different areas (A, B, C) was 
supposed to be temporary and to cease upon the conclusion of a final-status agreement 
that has not been concluded so far.  
Since the beginning of the occupation, the Israeli administration has passed a number of 
legislative acts related to the regulation of civil life in the area. These acts were mainly 
military orders, dealing with both the security needs of the Israeli citizens dwelling in 
the occupied territory and the activities of the Palestinian residents.13 Today, there are a 
number of Israeli settlements in the proximity of the Palestinian Dead Sea shore, built 
on lands which were owned by Palestinians in the past;14 according to a Fact-Finding 
Commission established by the UN Human Rights Council, “[e]ighty-six per cent of the 
Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea is under the de facto jurisdiction of the settlement 
regional councils. Settlements exploit mineral extraction and fertile agricultural lands, 
denying Palestinians access to their natural resources.”15 Israel mainly managed to seize 
these areas by declaring them ‘State land’, dispossessing the Palestinian population in 
embraces the notion that the territory of Israel does not include  the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East 
Jerusalem which together form the OPT; usually, commentators refer to the so-called Green Line, the 
armistice border created in 1949, but the exact position of Israeli and Palestinian borders is an issue still 
to be negotiated. See ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 72 (hereinafter: ‘Wall Opinion’). On the definition of 
these borders, see Michael Bothe, Drawing Borders as a Means to Restore and Maintain Peace: From 
Palestine to Kosovo and Back, in: Peter Hilpold (ed.), Kosovo and International Law: The ICJ Advisory 
Opinion of 22 July 2010 (2012), 181, 185. More generally, see Peter Malanczuk, Israel: Status, Territory 
and Occupied Territories, EPIL II (1990), 149.  
11
 The most important agreements forming the Oslo accords are the following: the Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993; the Agreement on Gaza Strip 
and Jericho Area, 4 May 1994; the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, 28 September 1995; the 
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, 17 January 1997; the Wye River Memorandum, 23 
October 1998; and the Agreement on Movement and Access, 15 November 2005 (all these treaties are 
available at: www.mfa.gov.il). For an overview, see Geoffrey R. Watson, The Oslo Accords: International 
Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Agreements (2000).
12
 See Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (note 11), Artt. XI(3) and XVII.
13
 On the Israeli administration, see Raja Shehadeh, The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military 
Occupation, in: Emma Playfair (ed.), International Law and the Administration of Occupied Territories 
(1992) 151; Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (2nd ed. 2012), 212 et seq. 
14
 See Al-Haq (note 8) 13.
15
 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to 
Investigate the Implications of the Israeli Settlements on the Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights of the Palestinian People Throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East 
Jerusalem, 7 February 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/22/63, para. 36. 
5order to build settlements and related infrastructures (e.g., roads); in addition, some 
areas were declared closed military areas or natural reserves.16
According to other sources, Israel prevents Palestinians from visiting the Dead Sea 
shore, and Israeli soldiers have been reported to have stopped Palestinians at 
checkpoints without any military or security needs, but only with the aim of excluding 
them from the beaches and the proximity of Israeli tourists.17
In addition to the physical hindrances for Palestinians trying to visit the Dead Sea shore, 
the Israeli administration has systematically denied construction permits for Palestinian 
tourism-related investments on the shore.18 Conversely, both Israel and Jordan have 
intensively developed the Dead Sea as a tourist destination and are reaping huge 
economic benefits: according to the World Bank, on the Jordanian and Israeli shores, 
there are about 20 5-star or 4-star hotels, with hotel revenues of USD 291 million 
accruing to Israel and 18 million accruing to Jordan in 2012.19 Palestinian investors and 
the population in general are deliberately precluded from this source of economic 
development.   
It is therefore necessary to evaluate Israeli policy related to the Palestinian Dead Sea 
shore in light of applicable international law.
III. The Law of Belligerent Occupation as the Principle Relevant Legal 
Framework
A. Positive Obligation of the Occupying Power to Encourage the Economic 
Development of the Occupied Territory
16
 Israel appropriated portions of land by declaring them closed military areas through Military Orders 
No. 151 (1 November 1967), 377 (19 March 1970), 378 (20 April 1970); other zones were declared 
natural reserves by Military Orders No. 363 (22 December 1969) and 373 (8 February 1970). Palestinian 
land has been seized also by Military Order No. 58 (22 December 1969), which declared abandoned land 
and, therefore, State land, all property belonging to Palestinians living in Israel who fled or were expelled 
in 1948, or who left the West Bank before 7 June 1967. For an overview on the Israeli policies about the 
seizure of Palestinian lands, see Raja Shehadeh, Occupier’s Law: Israel and the West Bank (1985), 17 et 
seq.; George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, The 
American University Law Review 43 (1994), 467.
17
 See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Protection of Civilians Weekly Report, 
17-23 October 2007, available at: www.ochaopt.org/documents/weekly%20briefing%20note%20230.pdf. 
See also Donald MacIntyre, Palestinians Barred from Dead Sea Beaches to “Appease Israeli Settlers”, 
The Independent, 14 June 2008, available at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/palestinians-barred-from-dead-sea-beaches-to-appease-israeli-settlers-846948.html; Jessica Purkiss, 
Tourism as a Tool to Erase Palestinian Identity, Middle East Monitor, 22 March 2014, available at:.
18
 World Bank, West Bank and Gaza: Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy, Report No. 
AUS2922, 2 October 2013, para. 46.
19
 Ibid., para. 47.
6In June 1967, Israel took control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, 
then held by Jordan and Egypt, during the international armed conflict commonly 
referred to as the Six-Day War.20 Accordingly, the OPT is under belligerent occupation, 
a situation in which a State gains effective control over a territory outside its boundaries 
through the use of military force.21 The concept of belligerent occupation is set out in 
Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations,22 as well as in international customary law.23 
Despite the fact that the Israeli government argues that the OPT is not occupied but 
simply administered,24 the rest of the international community shares the view that 
Israel is an Occupying Power bound by the relevant rules of international law,25 an 
opinion affirmed by the International Court of Justice in 200426 and by the Supreme 
Court of Israel itself.27 The Dead Sea coastline is clearly under occupation as it is part of 
the West Bank and, consequently, the international rules governing belligerent 
occupation, embodied in the 1907 Hague Regulations and in the 1949 Fourth Geneva 
Convention,28 apply to the area.29
20
 See, generally, John Quigley, The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis 
for Preventive War (2012).
21
 The literature about belligerent occupation is very rich. See, for instance, Yoram Dinstein, The 
International Law of Belligerent Occupation (2009); Robert Kolb/Sylvain Vité, Le droit de l’occupation 
militaire. Perspectives historiques et enjeux juridiques actuelles (2009); Vaios Koutroulis, Le début et la 
fin de l’application du droit de l’occupation (2010); Alessandra Annoni, L’occupazione “ostile” nel diritto 
internazionale contemporaneo (2012); Benvenisti, The International Law (note 13); Tristan Ferraro (ed.), 
Expert Meeting: Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory (2012).
22
 See Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907 (hereinafter: ‘the Hague 
Regulations’), Art. 42: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of 
the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established 
and can be exercised.”
23
 See Wall Opinion (note 10), para. 78.
24
 See the so-called Levi Report, 9 July 2012 (in Hebrew the report is available at: 
www.pmo.gov.il/Documents/doch090712.pdf; an unofficial English translation of the conclusions and 
recommendations is available at: 
unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/D9D07DCF58E781C585257A3A005956A6). This opinion cannot be 
analysed here in depth but has been envisaged in the past by Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: 
Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, Israel Law Review (ILR) 3 (1968), 279; Meir Shamgar, 
The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, Israel Yearbook of Human Rights 1 
(1971), 262. 
25
 See, among others, GA Res. 56/204 of 22 February 2002; GA Res. 69/93 of 16 December 2014; SC 
Res. 608 of 14 January 1988; SC Res. 726 of 6 January 1992; SC Res. 1322 of 7 October 2000.
26
 See Wall Opinion (note 10), para. 78.
27
 See HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, (2004) 58(5) Piskei Din 
807, para. 23, available in English at elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/04/560/020/A28/04020560.A28.pdf. 
Many Israeli scholars consider the Palestinian Territory to be under belligerent occupation; see, e.g., 
Dinstein (note 21),  20 et seq.; Benvenisti, The International Law (note 13), 203 et seq.
28
 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 
(hereinafter: ‘IV GC’).
29
 See Wall Opinion (note 10), para. 101. See also Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Harvard International Law Journal 44 (2003), 65.
7The dire life conditions of Palestinian inhabitants are a crucial part of the problem. It 
should be noted that the whole Palestinian economy is on the verge of bankruptcy due 
to the prolonged Israeli occupation and long-standing overexploitation of natural 
resources,30 the limitation of the Palestinian export, the Gaza blockade,31 and repeated 
Israeli decisions to retain taxes collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority in the 
OPT, most recently in as a reprisal for the Palestinian accession to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.32 Consequently, the issue is whether Israel, as the 
Occupying Power, has the duty to alleviate this economic situation even through 
measures aimed at developing the Palestinian economy, and whether granting access to 
the Dead Sea shore would, in part, accomplish this goal.
On the first point, one should take into account that Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations, an important provision related to duties and rights of the Occupying 
Power,33 provides: 
L’autorité du pouvoir légal ayant passé de fait entre les mains de l’occupant, 
celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dépendent de lui en vue de rétablir et 
d’assurer, autant qu’il est possible, l’ordre et la vie publique en respectant, 
sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays.
This provision is crucial in order to verify whether the Occupying Power has a duty, 
under international humanitarian law, to ameliorate the life conditions of the civilian 
population of the occupied territory, particularly in the form of legislation facilitating 
investment and economic development. 
A close analysis of the provision leads to the conclusion that this duty does indeed exist. 
Great attention should be paid to the words “rétablir et d’assurer, autant qu’il est 
30
 For some records of the effects of the occupation on the Palestinian economy, see Palestinian Ministry 
of National Economy, The Economic Costs of the Israeli Occupation for the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, September 2011, available at: 
www.un.org/depts/dpa/qpal/docs/2012Cairo/p2%20jad%20isaac%20e.pdf; International Labour Office, 
The Situation of Workers of the Occupied Arab Territories, ILC.102/DG/APP, 2013. More generally, see 
Mandy Turner/Omar Shweiki (eds), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and 
Beyond (2014).
31
 See UN Human Rights Council, Implementation of Human Rights Council resolutions S-9/1 and S-
12/1, 2 March 2015, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/80, para, 7 et seq. See also UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization, Consolidated Appeals 2013: West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2013, available at: 
www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/CAP_2013_WBGS.pdf.
32
 See Ruth Eglash, Israel Withholds Tax Revenue from Palestinian Authority as Dispute Escalates, The 
Washington Post, 3 January 2015, available at: www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-
withholds-tax-revenues-from-palestinian-authority-as-dispute-escalates/2015/01/03/3718e5c4-9378-11e4-
a66f-0ca5037a597d_story.html. In March 2015, Israel transferred part of the money to the Palestinian 
Authority, which rejected them arguing that the sum was too heavily reduced (see  Mohamad Torokman, 
Abbas Rejects Israel’s Partial Transfer of Palestinian Tax Revenue, Reuters, 5 April 2015, available at: 
www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/05/us-israel-palestinians-idUSKBN0MW0JU20150405). 
33
 “Article 43 is a sort of mini-constitution for the occupant administration” according to Benvenisti (note 
13), 69.
8possible, l’ordre et la vie publique”. The ‘vie publique’ concerns the “whole social, 
commercial and economic life of the community”34 and the obligation encompasses “a 
variety of aspects of civil life, such as the economy, society, education, welfare, health, 
[and] transport”.35 According to an authoritative interpretation, ‘ordre’ thus refers to the 
duty to take proper steps to protect the civilian population from attacks and crime, while 
the ‘vie publique’ implies a duty for the Occupying Power to promote the economic 
interests of the population.36
In order to respect and ensure public life, the occupation should not cause the freezing 
of the economic development of the occupied territory, but rather, the Occupying Power 
should foster the social and economic dimension of public life37 in accordance with its 
separate – but in any case relevant – duty to provide for the basic needs of the 
population of the occupied territory, embodied in Articles 55 and 56 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.
It is to be observed that in a short-term occupation maybe the Occupying Power has no 
positive obligation to adopt measures in order to develop the economy of the occupied 
territory; since the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention had not envisaged a 
prolonged occupation,38 in the treaty there is no explicit reference to the duty to foster 
the economy of the occupied territory. However, a positive duty can be constructed 
through implication on the basis of the assumption that the Israeli prolonged occupation 
per se disrupts the civil life of the OPT so that only a positive measure – such as 
allowing Palestinian access to the Dead Sea shore – could fulfil the Israeli obligation to 
preserve civil life of the protected population. This author does not argue that the so-
called prolonged occupation is governed by different rules than belligerent occupation 
tout court, an assumption rejected by a number of scholars;39 in my opinion, however, 
the prolonged character of the Israeli occupation is a factual – and not legal – element 
that should be taken in account in the interpretation of the rules governing belligerent 
34
 See Germany, British Zone of Control, Control Commission Court of Criminal Appeal, Grahame v. 
Director of Prosecutions, Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases 14 (1947), 228, 
232.
35
 Supreme Court of Israel, HC 393/82, A Cooperative Society Lawfully Registered in the Judea and 
Samaria Region v. Commander of the IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria Region et al., (1983) 37(4) 
Piskei Din 785.
36
 Dinstein (note 21), 93 et seq. 
37
 Ibid., 94; Benvenisti (note 13), 78 et seq. 
38
 See Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories since 1967, 
American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 84 (1990), 44, 47; Benvenisti (note 13), 244.
39
 This point has been masterfully assessed by Antonio Cassese, Powers and Duties of an Occupant in 
Relation to Land and Natural Resources, in: Playfair (note 13), 419, 419 et seq.  See also Roberts (note 
38), 51; Iain Scobbie, International Law and the Prolonged Occupation of Palestine, 20 May 2015, 
available at: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2611130. The former HRC Special Rapporteur 
John Dugard emphasised this idea in many reports, e.g. in UN Doc. A/HRC/4/17, 29 January 2007, para. 
62, and UN Doc. A/HRC/7/17, 21 January 2008, para. 8.
9occupation, above all in light of the aforementioned principle according to which 
occupation does not confer sovereignty on the Occupying Power.40
Consequently, the obligation to preserve and maintain civil life pursuant to Article 43 of 
the Hague Regulations, in the light of the prolonged character of the Israeli occupation 
and its actual repercussions on the Palestinian economy, can be interpreted in a manner 
that requires Israel, inter alia, to grant Palestinian access to the Dead Sea shore in order 
to develop the Palestinian economy.
This conclusion should not be overemphasized, because it could be used by an 
Occupying Power to overcome the limits of Article 43 and thus transform the legal 
order of the occupied territory by adopting legislation related to the economic 
development of that territory as if it were the sovereign.41 On the contrary, the 
international law governing belligerent occupation does not grant sovereignty to the 
Occupying Power, which cannot alter the status of the occupied territory;42 since 
belligerent occupation is concerned with powers over a territory and its population 
caused by de facto effective control and not by sovereignty, the Occupying Power is 
only an usufructuary or administrator of the occupied territory,43 with no right to 
conquer it.44 Today, belligerent occupation is no longer a mean of acquisition of 
territory, and the entire system of relevant rules implies that it is a temporary and 
exceptional situation.45
Accordingly, despite the fact that Israel could alleviate the economic hardship in the 
OPT by allowing Palestinian investors to exploit the Dead Sea coastline for tourism, its 
acts must not create confusion between its position as an Occupying Power and the 
sovereign rights of the Palestinian people. Since the Occupying Power is not the 
40
 Commentators have recognised that changes in the administration of an occupied territory during a 
prolonged occupation can be made in the interest of the original population; see, e.g., Benvenisti (note 
13), 147 et seq.; Dinstein (note 21), 120; Ferraro (note 21), 72 et seq.  In addition, according to Richard 
Falk, “The passage of time under the status quo has not been a neutral factor for Palestinians” (UN 
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the 
Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Richard Falk, 13 January 2014, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/67, para. 
25).
41
 See Christine Chinkin, Laws of Occupation, in: Neville Botha, Michèle Olivier, Delarey van Tonder 
(eds), Multilateralism and International Law with Western Sahara as a Case Study (2010), 167, 178.
42
 See, e.g., IV GC, Art. 47 and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, Art. 4. See also 
Affaire de la Dette Publique Ottomane (Bulgaria, Irak, Palestine, Transjordan, Greece, Italy and Turkey, 
Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1 (1925), 529, 555. For a modern overview, see  Dinstein (note 
21), 94 et seq. 
43
 See infra, III.C.
44
 See SC Res. 262 of 22 November 1967. For an analysis of the demise of the right of conquest in the 
context of the OPT, see Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in 
International Law and Practice (1996), 218 et seq. and 250 et seq. 
45
 See Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law, in: 
Playfair (note 13), 241, 244 et seq.; Arai-Takahashi (note 21), 48; Orna Ben-Naftali, Belligerent 
Occupation: A Plea for the Establishment of an International Supervisory Mechanism, in: Antonio 
Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (2012), 538, 546.
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sovereign, Israel has a duty to ensure stability and development of economic life in the 
occupied territory, but must implement it while respecting the laws in force in the 
territory, and, above all, in a manner consistent with the interests of the legitimate 
sovereign, since respect for the sovereign rights of the occupied territory is the 
fundamental criterion of the legality of the Occupying Power’s acts.46 In other words, 
the duty to ameliorate the economic situation of the occupied territory cannot lead an 
Occupying Power to adopt policies that could lead to the de facto annexation of the 
occupied territory. 
In order to verify the lawfulness of an Occupying Power’s positive measures, a good 
test should rely on the concrete advantage of the new policy: if it benefits only the 
Occupying Power, it should be considered unlawful, whilst if it benefits the local 
population, there is room to argue that it is lawful, provided that it does not strengthen 
the Occupying Power’s claims over the territory.47 This test could dispel the 
understandable suspicion surrounding every positive action taken by the Occupying 
Power:48 a positive action in the economic dimension could both preserve the distinction 
between the legitimate sovereign and the Occupying Power, and protect and enhance 
the living conditions of the civilian population. A policy allowing Palestinian investors 
to access the Dead Sea coastline, thereby encouraging the growth of Palestine’s tourism 
industry, would respect the duty not to consolidate sovereignty over the occupied 
territory (since the beneficiaries would be Palestinian investors and not Israeli 
companies) and implement the obligation to restore and ensure the civil life of the 
Palestinian population.  However, it should be acknowledged that the assessment of 
such benefits can lead to different outcomes since its value-laden and subjective 
character.
In view of the above, Israel is under a duty to ensure that the areas of the OPT under its 
control do not suffer poverty and economic stagnation and, because of the prolonged 
character of the occupation, this aim can be achieved only through by encouraging the 
development of the Palestinian economy. Granting Palestinian investors access to the 
Dead Sea coastline would significantly improve the Palestinian situation in this regard 
since, as demonstrated by the aforementioned World Bank study, Palestine could enjoy 
46
 For this opinion, see Alain Pellet, La Denstruction de Troie N’Aura pas Lieu, PYBIL 4 (1987-1988), 
45, 65 et seq., reprinted in English in Playfair (note 13), 169.  
47
 See also Institut de Droit International, Bruges Declaration on the Use of Force, 2 September 2003: 
“the Occupying Power can only dispose of the resources of the occupied territory to the extent necessary 
for the current administration of the territory and to meet the essential needs of the population” (emphasis 
added) (available at: www.idi-iil.org/idiE/declarationsE/2003_bru_en.pdf).
48
 For the contrary position, according to which there is no positive duty at all for the Occupying Power to 
ameliorate the economic conditions of the occupied territory in light of Art. 43, see Stefano Silingardi, 
Occupazione bellica e obblighi delle Potenze Occupanti nel campo economico, Rivista di diritto 
internazionale 89 (2006), 978, 1020 et seq. Such an opinion does not take into any account the fact that 
barely all the treaty provisions about a duty to ‘ensure’ a right implies positive duties, e.g. in human rights 
conventions.
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significant financial benefits from the development of a new sector of its tourism 
industry. 
The main problem related to this conclusion is that an Occupying Power enjoys, to a 
certain extent, discretionary power in relation to the measures it can adopt to implement 
Article 43. It seems unlikely that the Occupying Power is specifically under an 
obligation to conclude concessionary contracts related the exploitation of natural 
resources, not even if they were under negotiation at the beginning of the occupation.49 
However, in the broader context of the precarious economic conditions of the entire 
OPT that are direct consequence of the prolonged occupation, it is reasonable to affirm 
that the general duty for Israel to ensure the economic livelihood in the occupied 
territory, especially in Area C, could be partly addressed by allowing Palestinian 
investors to develop a tourism industry on the Dead Sea shore.
B.  Assessing Israeli Denials of Access to Palestinian Investors to the Dead Sea 
Coastline under International Humanitarian Law
After having analysed the issue of Israeli positive duties, the legality of its denial of 
access to the Palestinian Dead Sea shore has to be addressed. 
The Israeli policy is not grounded on the powers conferred to Israel by international 
law, particularly those embodied in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and in Article 
64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the latter of which provides “an amplification and 
clarification”50 of the former. Article 64, second paragraph, of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention states:
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied 
territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to 
fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly 
government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying 
Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or 
administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of 
communication used by them.51
49
 See Iain Scobbie, Natural Resources and Belligerent Occupation: Mutation Through Permanent 
Sovereignty, in: Stephen Bowen (ed.), Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (1997), 221, 235. Writing about the duty of ensuring food and supplies 
pursuant to Art. 55 of IV GC, Jean Pictet commented that: “the Convention does not lay down the 
method by which this is to be done. The occupying authorities retain complete freedom of action in 
regard to this” (Jean Pictet (ed.), Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958), 310).
50
 Joyce A. C. Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, British Yearbook of International Law 26 
(1949), 294, 324. See also Pictet (note 49), 335.
51
 Emphasis added. Despite its title (‘Penal Legislation’), the criteria of Art. 64 are applicable also to civil 
legislation (see Pictet (note 49), 335).
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According to Articles 43 of the Hague Regulations and 64 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, the Occupying Power has the right to provide for its security needs and to 
maintain control over the occupied territory, but all its actions that are not justified by 
security needs should be considered legitimate only if they aim to ameliorate the life 
conditions of the civilian population of the occupied territory or to fulfil humanitarian 
law obligations.52 The security needs of the Occupying Power and the basic life 
conditions of the civilian population are not the only legal interests protected by these 
norms, which also reflect the attempt to preclude the Occupying Power from asserting 
sovereignty at the expense of the actual sovereign.53 
On these bases, the Israeli policy of denying Palestinian investors access to the Dead 
Sea coastline appears to be inconsistent with international humanitarian law for the 
following reasons.
First, banning Palestinian people and investors from the Dead Sea shore is not justified 
by any necessity of the Occupying Power to maintain order in the occupied territory nor 
to ensure Israel’s security. The development of a Palestinian tourism industry cannot 
objectively be regarded as a threat to public order in the OPT nor can it endanger the 
Occupying Power’s security. Neither can the general condition of Israeli settlers be 
invoked to deny Palestinian investors access to the Dead Sea coastline, because the 
settlements are illegal under international law54 as recognized by the International Court 
of Justice,55 and the principle ex injuria jus non oritur precludes the author of an illicit 
act from invoking consequences arising from its own violation in order to evade another 
international obligation.56 However real security concerns related to the Israeli 
settlements may be, they have been created by Israel through promoting and building 
the settlements, a policy that is a violation of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention57 and a violation of the duty to preserve the status quo in the occupied 
52
 See Marco Sassòli, Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by Occupying Powers, 
European Journal of International Law (EJIL) 16 (2005), 661, 678 et seq. See also Alessandra 
Lanciotti/Annalisa Giansanti, Il processo elettorale iracheno alla luce del diritto internazionale, 
Federalismi.it 5 (2005) 1, 5, available at: www.federalismi.it/federalismi/document/10032005030732.pdf. 
53
 See Chinkin (note 41), 178.
54
 See IV GC, Art. 49(6). See also UN Human Rights Council (note 15). For the relevant State practice, 
see ICRC, Customary IHL, Practice Relating to Rule 130: Transfer of Own Civilian Population into 
Occupied Territory, available at: www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule130. See also Jean 
Salmon, Les colonies de peuplement israéliennes en territoire palestinien occupé au regard de l’avis 
consultatif de la Cour internationale de Justice du 9 juillet 2004, in : Andrea Fischer-Lescano et al. 
(Hrsg), Frieden in Freiheit, Peace in liberty, Paix en liberté – Festschrift fur Michal Bothe zum 70. 
Geburtstag (2008), 285. 
55
 See Wall Opinion (note 10), para. 120. 
56
 On this principle, see John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (1987), 132 et seq.
57
 Art. 49(6) of the IV GC does not distinguish between direct and indirect transfer of population. The ICJ 
in the Wall Opinion considered that all the Israeli settlements are unlawful, a conclusion that is correct 
since the absence of a distinction in Art. 49(6) implies that both settlements that were directly created by 
the Occupying Power and those that were only sponsored by it through measures such as fiscal benefits 
are prohibited (see UN Human Rights Council (note 15), para 21). This conclusion is confirmed by Art. 
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territory as spelled out in Article 43.58 Accordingly, measures taken with the intention 
of protecting the illegal settlers cannot be considered justified by military necessity 
since this conclusion would undermine the norm on the illegality of the settlements.59 
Second, Israeli policy related to access to the Dead Sea should be analysed in light of 
the needs of the Palestinian civilian population living in the area, due to the provision of 
Article 43 relating to the civil life of the population of the occupied territory. According 
to international humanitarian law and contrary to the Supreme Court of Israel’s opinion,
60
 Article 43 should be interpreted as protecting only the indigenous Palestinian 
population, and not the Israeli citizens illegally transferred by the Occupying Power, 
because Article 43 of the Hague Regulations must be read in light of Article 4 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, which defines protected persons in a way that precludes 
Israeli settlers from being considered the protected population.61 Article 43 does not 
provide any distinction between native protected population and Occupying Power’s 
nationals, since the concept of protected population was envisaged only forty years later 
by Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, according to Article 154, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention completes the Hague Regulations62 and therefore Article 43 
of the Hague Regulations must be interpreted in the light of Articles 4 and 49(6) of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, through the prism of the systemic interpretation envisaged 
by Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.63 As a conclusion, 
it can be argued that the Occupying Power’s duty to ensure civil life in the occupied 
territory pursuant to Article 43 of the Hague Regulation regards only the life conditions 
of the native protected population (the Palestinians in the Dead Sea area), since the 
inclusion of the Israeli settlers under Article 43’s ummbrella would be in conflict with 
8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Law, which punishes both direct and 
indirect transfers. Totally voluntary settlements with no link to the Occupying Power’s administration 
(the so-called outposts) are illegal as well since the Occupying Power has a duty to prevent  that its own 
population commits wrongful acts in the occupied territory (Arai-Takahashi (note 21), 348).
58
 See Shehadeh, Occupier’s Law (note 16), 45 et seq.; Benvenisti (note 13), 241.
59 See Ardi Imseis, Critical Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall 
Advisory Opinion, ASIL 99 (2005), 102, 112, footnote 52, where this Author replies to the opposite 
opinion offered by David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International 
Humanitarian Law, ibid.,  88, 93 et seq.
60
 See, among others, HCJ 10356/02, Hass v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, 4 March 
2004; HCJ 2056/04, Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, 30 June 2004; HCJ 
7957/04, Mara'abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, 15 September 2005; HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din v . The 
Commander of IDF, 26 December 2011.
61
 See Aeyal M. Gross, The Construction of a Wall between The Hague and Jerusalem: The Enforcement 
and Limits of Humanitarian Law and the Structure of Occupation, Leiden Journal of International Law 
(LJIL) 19 (2006), 393, 418; Id., Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New Clothes of 
the International Law of Occupation?, EJIL 18 (2007), 1, 13 et seq.; Martti Koskenniemi, Occupied Zone: 
“A Zone of Reasonableness”?, ILR 41 (2008), 13, 40.
62
 See IV GC, Art. 154: ‘complètera’. 
63
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1155, 331. According to Art. 
31(3)(c), “There shall be taken into account, together with the context: [...] (c) any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”
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the Fourth Geneva Convention’s rules. Consequently, the Israeli policy is lawful as long 
as it enhances the civil life of the Palestinian population, ameliorating their life 
conditions, whilst at the same time not endangering the sovereign rights of Palestinians 
over the West Bank. The Israeli policy related to the Dead Sea shore does not meet the 
criteria of Article 43 since, as noted above, it only worsens the life conditions of the 
Palestinian people and, at the same time, consolidates the presence of illegal settlers in 
so far as it allows them to exploit the Palestinian Dead Sea coastline. 
Third, the Israeli policy should be examined in light of the aforementioned principle that 
the Occupying Power must refrain from modifying the laws in force and altering 
permanently the status of the territory. The settlements’ regime as a whole, but 
including in the Dead Sea area, has been created on land seized through new legislation 
that has changed the law in force in the territory beyond the limits embodied in treaty 
law64 and could assume the features of a fait accompli and lead to the de facto 
annexation of a portion of territory.65 As a result, the Dead Sea area faces an alteration 
in the demographic composition of its population, with a dramatic decrease in the 
Palestinian residents and a constant increase in the number of Israeli settlers.66 
There is therefore no room to argue that the Israeli denial of access to the Palestinian 
Dead Sea shore is justified by the rules on belligerent occupation, as developed in 
customary law and enshrined in the relevant treaties. 
C. The Norms Regarding the Exploitation of Natural Resources under Belligerent 
Occupation and the Development of Tourism on the Palestinian Dead Sea Coast
The norms governing the exploitation of natural resources in an occupied territory can 
be relevant for the analysis of the Dead Sea situation.
The first provision deserving attention is Article 53(1) of the Hague Regulations:
An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and 
realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of 
arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable 
property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations.67
The test spelled out in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention for the destruction 
of State property is particularly narrow:
64
 See supra, II.
65
 See UN Human Rights Council (note 40), para. 16. The International Court of Justice stated that the 
wall built in the West Bank and the related regime (settlements included) can lead to de facto annexation 
of some portions of the West Bank (Wall Opinion (note 10), para. 121).
66




Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property 
belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to 
other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is 
prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by 
military operations.68
Despite the fact that international humanitarian law conventions do not offer any 
definition of State property,69 it is clear that these provisions are relevant in a discussion 
about the legality of Israeli exploitation of natural resources in the Palestinian Territory.
Therefore, these provisions are applicable to the exploitation of Dead Sea curative mud 
by Israeli settlements and companies, as well as the seizure of the lands in the area of 
the coastline and the correlated use of water.70 These rules are relevant even if the 
exploitation is carried on by private persons and commercial entities: according to the 
International Court of Justice, the Occupying Power has the duty to control that legal 
and physical persons under its jurisdiction does not illegally exploit natural resources in 
the occupied territory pursuant to Article 43.71 All these activities should be performed 
only as a response to the military needs of the Occupying Power, which has no 
sovereign right but only the powers of an usufructuary pursuant to Article 55 of the 
Hague Regulations, according to which:
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and 
usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates 
belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must 
safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance 
with the rules of usufruct.
Article 55 is inspired by the principle that the occupant does not displace the sovereign 
in the occupied territory.72 On the basis of all the aforementioned treaty provisions, it is 
clear that Israel has a duty not to expend the curative mud and the waters of the Dead 
Sea coastline, since, at the end of the occupation, the Palestinian population should be 
able to enjoy the exploitation of those resources. This conclusion is clearly consistent 
with the said temporary and exceptional characters of belligerent occupation.73 By 
contrast, Israeli industries go beyond their right of use and overexploit the Dead Sea 




 See Scobbie (note 49), 232.
70
 Arai-Takahashi (note 21), 211.
71
 See ICJ, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005, para. 178 et seq., 219 et seq. and 248 et seq. 
(hereinafter: ‘Armed Activities Case’).
72
 See Scobbie (note 49), 233.
73
 See also Cassese (note 39), 428 et seq.; Silingardi (note 48), 1020; Valentina Zambrano, Il principio di 
sovranità permanente dei popoli sulle risorse naturali tra vecchie e nuove violazioni (2009), 130.
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example, has pumped more than 200 MCM/per year of water out of the Dead Sea, while 
wastewaters from Israeli factories flow directly into the basin.74 
However, the legal framework relating to the protection of State property during an 
occupation does not provide useful answers to the problem of the Israeli policy 
prohibiting Palestinians from developing a tourist industry on the Dead Sea coastline. 
The main problem is that although these norms limit the scope of the Occupying 
Power’s ability to exploit the natural resources of the occupied territory, they are silent 
about an Occupying Power’s obligations to encourage or prevent the protected 
population of the territory from accessing the resources. The reference to the role of 
usufructuary is not crucial, because a usufructuary can lawfully decide not to derive 
profits from a portion of the goods administrated, renouncing to the ‘fruits’.75 
D. Brief Remarks on the Impact of International Human Rights Law on the Palestinian 
Access to the Dead Sea Shore
According to a well-established international case law, international human rights law 
apply along with international humanitarian law in time of belligerent occupation, with 
the only exception of the invocation of clauses of derogation embodied in some human 
rights conventions.76 In the case of unavoidable conflicts between human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, the International Court of Justice affirmed that, in the 
context of an armed conflict, the latter prevails on the former as a matter of lex 
specialis.77 However, the reference to the lex specialis principle has been recently 
omitted by the International Court of Justice dealing with a situation of belligerent 
occupation,78 and many scholars consider that international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law both apply complementarily in similar cases.79 Eventual 
conflicts must be solved through the application of the rules on treaty interpretation 
74
 See Al-Haq (note 8), 23 et seq.
75 According to Iustiniani Institutiones II.2.4: “Usus fructus est ius alienis rebus utendi fruendi salva 
rerum substantia.” 
76
 See, e.g., ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of  8 July 1996, 
para. 25; Wall Opinion (note 10), para. 106; Armed Activities Case (note 71), para. 216. See also Orna 
Ben-Naftali/Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 
ILR 37 (2004-2004), 17; Noam Lubell, Human Rights Obligations in Military Occupation, International 
Review of the Red Cross 94 (2012), 317.
77
 See ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (note 76), para. 25; Wall Opinion (note 10), 
para. 106. 
78
 Armed Activities Case (note  71), para. 216.
79
 See Kolb/Vité (note 21), 334; Marko Milanovic, A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship 
between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, JCSL 14 (2010), 459, 464; Annoni 
(note 21), 126.
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embodied in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, especially the 
aforementioned systemic criterion embodied in Article 31(3)(c).80
For the situation of the Palestinian Dead Sea shore it is particularly relevant the fact that 
Israel is party to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,81 which is binding upon Israel also for its activities in the OPT.82 According to 
Article 6, Israel must “recognize[s] the right to work” by providing “technical and 
vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady 
economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment.”83 
Israeli policy regarding the Palestinian Dead Sea shore violates this provision since it 
prevents Palestinians from gaining economic development through the exploitation of 
natural resources.
Even Article 12(1) of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is 
particularly relevant, since it provides that “[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a 
State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to 
choose his residence.”84 Israel is party even to this treaty and must implement it even in 
its activities in the OPT.85 The ban on the Palestinian access to the Dead Sea coastline is 
clearly a violation of liberty of movement of the Palestinians. 
All these human rights law provisions must be applied along with international 
humanitarian law in the OPT and, specifically, in the Dead Sea area. Moreover, treaty 
international humanitarian law must be interpreted in light of international human rights 
law, especially when the former is not crystal-clear about the duties of the Occupying 
Power, such as in the case of the obligation to encourage the economic life of the 
occupied territory. In the present author’s view, there are thus sound reasons to argue 
that the existence of this duty is supported also by the aforementioned relevant 
obligations embodied in the human rights conventions. 
E. Partial Conclusion on the Impact of the Law on Belligerent Occupation on the 
Palestinian Access to the Dead Sea Coastline
In light of the relevant rules on belligerent occupation – in particular those concerning 
the faculties and obligations of the Occupying Power – it is not possible to conclude that 
80
 See Jean D’Aspremont/Elodie Tranchez, The Quest for Non-Conflictual Coexistence of International 
Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law: Which Role for the Lex Specialis Principle?, in: Robert 
Kolb/Gloria Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
(2013), 223, 235 et seq.
81
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3. 
82
 Wall Opinion (note 10), para. 112. See also Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports 
submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding observations of the Human 




 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
85
 Wall Opinion (note 10), para. 107 et seq.
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Israel has a specific duty to grant access to the Dead Sea shore to the Palestinian 
population and investors. However, pursuant to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations, 
Israel must ensure the economic wellbeing of the Palestinian population. Because of the 
dramatic economic situation in the OPT, the prolonged character of the occupation, and 
the likely benefits from the exploitation of Dead Sea tourism potential, the Israeli policy 
of systematically preventing Palestinian access and exploitation of the Dead Sea shore 
constitutes a violation of the obligation to ensure and protect civil life in the occupied 
territory. In addition, the Israeli policy appears to lack any legal justification under the 
rules of belligerent occupation and is also inconsistent with international human rights 
law.
IV. The Principles of Self-Determination of People and Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources Applied to Palestinian Access to the Dead Sea Coastline
A. Self-Determination of Peoples and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in 
the Palestinian Context
The application of international human rights law along with international humanitarian 
law in situations of belligerent occupation demonstrates that the law governing 
belligerent occupation is not a self-contained regime,86 but rather, is affected by other 
international law rules. 
One pivotal rule of international law to be taken into account for the purpose of the 
present paper is the principle of self-determination of peoples.87 This principle is one of 
the most important rules of international law; it is embodied in Articles 1(2) and 55 of 
the UN Charter, as well as in Article 1 common to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and it is clearly part of international customary law.88 The International Court of 
Justice has ruled that the self-determination principle entails obligations erga omnes,89 
whilst many scholars consider the principle to be jus cogens.90
86
 On self-contained regimes in international law, see Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 16 (1985), 111. See, more recently, Lorenzo Gradoni, 
Regime failure nel diritto internazionale (2009). 
87
 On the relations between the law of occupation and the principle of self-determination, see Jorge 
Cardona  Llorens, Le principe du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes et l'occupation étrangère, in:  
Droit du pouvoir, pouvoir du droit: Mélanges offerts à Jean Salmon (2007), 855.
88
 On the self-determination principle, see, among others, Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of 
Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1999); Joshua Castellino, International Law and Self-determination 
(2000); Duncan French (ed.), Statehood and Self-Determination (2013).
89ICJ, Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment of 30 June 1995, para. 29; Wall 
Opinion (note 10), para. 88.
90
 See Jochen A. Frowein, Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations Under International Law, in: 
Christian Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination (1993), 211, 218 et seq. See also the 
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Today, no State or scholar seriously doubts of the existence of a Palestinian people. On 
a number of circumstances, the United Nations has recognised that the Palestinian 
people is entitled to exercise its right to self-determination.91 For many years, the 
Palestine Liberation Organization has been exercising self-determination on behalf of 
the Palestinian people, with the strong support and acknowledgment of the United 
Nations.92 Furthermore, in 2012 the UN General Assembly conferred on Palestine the 
status of UN non-member State.93 Today, even due to Palestinian participation in a 
number of multilateral conventions only opened to States, there are sound reasons to 
argue that a Palestinian State under belligerent occupation exists in light of international 
law.94 
The relevance of the self-determination principle in relation to the exploitation of 
natural resources in the Palestinian Territory cannot be underestimated. In the last half a 
century, the international community has realized that the availability of natural 
resources is one pivotal component of the principle of self-determination: a group of 
people can actually gain independence, determinate their constitutional architecture, and 
choose an international policy only if they have full control over their resources. A 
people or a State lacking the possibility of exploiting their own resources due to the 
activity of another State is likely under a different form of colonial domination, thus in a 
situation of diminished self-determination.95 As a consequence, the self-determination 
principle has evolved beyond the political right to decide the internal and international 
status of a community, to also encompass the so called principle of economic self-
determination.96 According to Article 1(1) common to 1966 Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights and Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, “[b]y virtue of th[e right of 
self-determination, all peoples] freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”
opinion of the International Law Commission, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, Art. 26, Yearbook of the International Law 
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After the principle of self-determination, a new and partially autonomous customary 
norm, i.e. permanent sovereignty over natural resources, emerged, first as a political 
goal of the UN, but later as a legal norm.97 The principle has its roots in the economic 
development of Third World countries and in the right of self-determination of 
colonised peoples, but is still relevant in post-colonial situations as a component of 
State sovereignty.98 More recently, developing countries have invoked it to secure 
benefits arising from the exploitation of natural resources and to provide developing 
States with a legal defence against infringements of their economic sovereignty as a 
result of property or contractual rights claimed by other States and foreign investors.99 
The permanent sovereignty over natural resources relies on a number of General 
Assembly declarations of principles,100 which are not themselves binding acts, but 
rather are important evidence of the States’ opinio juris due to the broad consensus they 
have gathered in the Assembly.101 However, this principle is also embodied in treaty 
provisions, which are directly binding upon the State parties. According to Article 1(2) 
common to the 1966 Covenants,
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.102
These international acts, both of soft law and hard law, along with a consistent State 
practice, are the basis on which it is possible to build the normative content of the 
97
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principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources that is part of customary 
international law.103
The core content of the principle is set out in Article 1 of the General Assembly 
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Resolution 1803 (XVII) 
of 14 December 1962, according to which:
The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national 
development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned.
In the Palestinian context, Palestinian sovereignty over natural resources, 
notwithstanding the occupation, has been affirmed a number of times by the General 
Assembly.104 It is clear that the prolonged Israeli occupation raises serious concerns 
regarding the natural resources of the Palestinian Territory, since an Occupying Power 
that exploits the natural resources of the occupied territory even for military necessity – 
therefore lawfully, according to international humanitarian law – nonetheless exploits 
and reduces the natural resources of a people, especially if the occupation lasts for many 
decades.105 
The present author does not want to enter the complex debate about who possesses 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources – States or peoples – an issue which arises 
from the different wording of the relevant provisions.106 Suffice to say, according to 
Article 1(2) of the Covenants, peoples, not only States, are entitled to sovereignty over 
natural resources; this is consistent with the principle of self-determination and relevant 
to the Palestinian situation, since the international community conferred both the related 
rights of self-determination and sovereignty over their natural resources to Palestinian 
people through the British Mandate.107 It should be noted that the dissolution of the 
League of Nations cannot be seen as the end of the rights conferred by this organisation 
through the mandates system, since, according to Article 80 of the UN Charter, all the 
rights conferred under the mandate system must be presumed still in force under the 
UN.108 Accordingly, Palestinian self-determination and sovereignty over natural 
resources are still legally valid and binding. In the past the Palestine Liberation 
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Organization was the only actor that has exercised these rights on behalf of the 
Palestinian people, whilst the State of Palestine stepped in recently, enjoying 
sovereignty over natural resources the same as all other States.109
Article 1(2) of the 1966 International Covenants is also relevant since it is binding upon 
Israel and Palestine, both of which are parties to the Covenants.110 In addition, the 
Covenants emphasize that in no case can a people be deprived of the basic means of 
subsistence, reinforcing the aforementioned international humanitarian law obligations 
not to starve the population of an occupied territory. 
On these premises, it is now possible to analyse whether the principles of self-
determination and permanent sovereignty over natural resources are applicable to the 
Dead Sea coastline and whether they could be used as the legal framework on which to 
base a Palestinian right to exploit its potential for tourism.
B. The Application of the Principles of Self-Determination and Permanent Sovereignty 
during Belligerent Occupation
The principle of self-determination is applicable even in situation of belligerent 
occupation, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice in relation to the OPT.111 
Consequently, according to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, the principle of self-determination must be regarded as an interpretative tool of 
the treaty-based rules on belligerent occupation. As noted afore, the rules on belligerent 
occupation attempt to preserve the rights of the legitimate sovereign, resulting in the 
possibility of a systematic and harmonic interpretation between the principle and 
international humanitarian law. It is, however, important to emphasize that a situation of 
belligerent occupation is intrinsically a violation of the self-determination of a people, 
but this essay is not the proper occasion to discuss the lawfulness of the occupation 
itself.112 
 Conversely, the application of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources in times of belligerent occupation is more controversial.113 According to the 
International Court of Justice:
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[T]he Court notes that there is nothing in [the...] General Assembly 
resolutions [about permanent sovereignty] which suggests that they are 
applicable to the specific situation of looting, pillage and exploitation of 
certain natural resources by members of the army of a State militarily 
intervening in another State, which is the subject-matter of the DRC’s third 
submission. The Court does not believe that this principle is applicable to 
this type of situation.114
This passage resulted in many criticisms. According to the prevalent reading of the 
judgment, the Court means that the principle of sovereignty over natural resources does 
not apply during armed conflict or belligerent occupation,115 probably because 
international humanitarian law rules would trump it as a matter of lex specialis. 
However, this conclusion seems to be inconsistent with the aforementioned practice of 
the General Assembly, which emphasized the application of the principle during the 
Israeli occupation. Moreover, this passage does not take into account the fact that the 
principle of sovereignty over natural resources originated as a corollary of the principle 
of self-determination, which the Court considers applicable during belligerent 
occupation. The Court’s position is also in conflict with a number of binding Security 
Council resolutions, adopted during the occupation of Iraq, wherein the Council 
affirmed the right of the Iraqi State to sovereignty over its natural resources, 
notwithstanding the occupation.116 The Security Council invoked the respect for the 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources even during the conflict in DRC.117 
As noted afore with regard to international human rights law, the most recent case law 
of the International Court of Justice clearly implies that the application of international 
humanitarian law is not a hindrance to the application of other relevant treaty provisions 
as a matter of principle. Consequently, the Court’s position on the application of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty appears to be inconsistent both with the States’ and 
the UN’s practice, as well as with the Court’s own jurisprudence.  
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The International Court of Justice’s decision should not be overestimated. 
Notwithstanding the prestige and the influence of the World Court, its decision are 
binding only on the parties to each dispute. Since there is room to argue that its position 
is not in line with the practice and opinio juris of States and international organizations, 
it is possible to conclude that, according to customary international law, permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources is a principle applicable even during armed conflicts 
and occupations.118
Moreover, the fact that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is 
mentioned also in treaties (the 1966 International Covenants), which the Court considers 
binding upon Israel even during the occupation, is sufficient to suggest that the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is applicable even in times of 
belligerent occupation as a matter of international human rights treaty law, at least when 
it does not conflict with international humanitarian law in a way that cannot be resolved 
through the rules of interpretation.119 This conclusion is consistent with the fact that 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a principle strictly related to self-
determination, and, therefore, it would be unreasonable to consider only the latter 
applicable when the two share a common origin. Moreover, in the field of the economic 
development of an occupied territory, an accurate analysis of the belligerent occupation 
rules shows that they are largely consistent with, when not clearly inspired by, the need 
to preserve the original populations’ sovereignty over natural resources.120
The nature of the principles of self-determination and permanent sovereignty makes 
them particularly suitable to function as interpretative guidance when applying 
international humanitarian rules.121 Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that 
international law on belligerent occupation, self-determination, and permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources should be applied during belligerent occupation and 
can be interpreted in a coherent way.
C. Partial Conclusion on the Palestinian Self-Determination and Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources Related to the Access to the Dead Sea Coastline
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In the present author’s view, there are scant doubts that the related principles of self-
determination and permanent sovereignty form legal basis for Palestinian claims to 
accessing the Dead Sea coastline122 in order to develop a rich touristic industry, since 
the curative mud of the Dead Sea as well as the white sunny beaches and the waters are 
natural resources. The Palestinian people enjoy these rights and can exercise them today 
through the State of Palestine, since the General Assembly, the body which most 
contributed to the development of the two principles, considers Palestine to be a State.
123
Consequently, since the Occupying Power does not enjoy sovereignty over natural 
resources in the occupied territory, it is illegal under international law for Israel to 
exploit the said resources and  deny access to them to Palestinian investors. 
International humanitarian law confers to the Occupant certain powers which must be 
exercised only to ensure its safety in the occupied territory; in this respect, the law of 
belligerent occupation can be considered lex specialis in relation to the principle of 
sovereignty over natural resources, but without any justification grounded in 
international humanitarian law, the Occupying Power cannot prevent the people of the 
occupied territory from enjoying their rights.124 
Moreover, according to the Natural Resources Declaration, a violation of the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources “is contrary to the spirit and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders the development of international 
cooperation and the maintenance of peace”125. This is particularly true in the broader 
Palestinian context, were natural resources played a great role in fuelling the conflict. 
V. The Relevant Treaty Provisions of the Oslo Accords
According to Article 1(2) of the Covenants, the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources should be exercised “without prejudice to any obligations arising out 
of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit”. In 
the Palestinian context, the most relevant bilateral agreement on economic cooperation 
is the Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Programs, Annex VI to the Interim 
Agreement (hereinafter: Annex). Article V(6) of the Annex provides:
a. In order to best utilize the unique advantages provided to the tourism 
industry in conditions of stability, the two sides shall examine ways to: […] 
(5) encourage joint ventures in the tourism field in all areas of mutual 
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benefit including on the Dead Sea. In this regard Palestinian private 
projects as well as joint ventures in accordance with the DOP, will be 
located as agreed on the shore of the Dead Sea.126
Moreover, the Annex also demands the free movement of tourists in the area, since 
Article V(6)(c) prescribes that: “The two sides shall facilitate and encourage smooth 
movement of tourists between their respective areas”.
These are the key bilateral provisions related to the development of tourism on the 
Palestinian Dead Sea coastline. The Annex, as well as all the Oslo accords, are proper 
international agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, thus 
their norms are binding for both the parties.127 Since embodied in an international treaty, 
the duty to encourage investments on the coastline of the Dead Sea, even from 
Palestinian private investors, is an obligation independently chosen by Israel, which can 
only derogate from it in the cases allowed by treaty law.128 However, in this field, the 
Annex puts forward only obligations of means, i.e. the parties have only the duty to 
discuss in good faith the exploitation of the Dead Sea coastline, but are largely free to 
disagree on the measures that should be adopted and whether or not to reach an 
agreement.
Other general rules of the Annex are also relevant for the Dead Sea coastline. According 
to Article IV(4) “…a. developing the infrastructure and a strong base for the Palestinian 
economy; … d. working together to promote social development and foster the rise of 
Palestinian standards of living…” are some of aims of the economic cooperation 
between the parties. These provisions must be taken in account in the interpretation of 
the entire Annex, since they underscore its scope.129 
Article III establishes a Standing Cooperation Committee, with the mandate of ensuring 
the implementation of the Annex. Unfortunately, the Committee ceased its work in 
2000, when tensions between the two parties arose after a period of relative calm.130 Its 
brief life is the major shortcoming of the Annex, since it does not provide for other 
implementation mechanisms.
It is clear that the Oslo accords, despite their vague drafting, show that the Palestinian 
investors have the right to participate in the exploitation of the Dead Sea shore, with the 
cooperation of the Israeli military administration. This conclusion is consistent with the 
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At least a further inquiry would be necessary, in order to evaluate whether Israel and/or 
the Palestinian State are responsible for having suspended the activity of the Committee, 
a fact that is a per se breach of an obligation enshrined in the Annex.
VI. Concluding remarks on the Legal Consequences of the Israeli Policy and the 
Available Remedies
After having affirmed that the Israeli policy related to Palestinian accession of the Dead 
Sea coastline violates a number of international norms, the legal consequences should 
be briefly addressed, as well as the remedies available for Palestinians.
Firstly, Israel is under a duty to cease the wrongful act, to offer assurances of non-
repetition, and to make full reparation.131 Secondly, there is room to argue that some of 
the violated norms (maybe some international humanitarian law rules132 and more likely 
the principle of the self-determination133) are jus cogens and entail obligations erga 
omnes.134 However, the special regime related to these kinds of norms is not applicable 
in the present case, since the denial of access to the Dead Sea shore cannot be 
considered a ‘serious breach’ of the aforementioned norms given that Israel enjoys some 
discretional powers related to the measures that should be adopted pursuant to Article 
43 of the Hague Regulations – a circumstance that could be a hindrance in assessing the 
seriousness of the breach.135 Conversely, the whole regime of the settlements in the area 
and their overexploitation of the natural resources of the coastline functions as the 
broader framework for serious violations of international peremptory norms in which 
the denial of access could be properly addressed.   
In addition, it should be noted that international humanitarian law specifically lacks an 
effective institutional mechanism for implementation.136 Even an intervention of the 
Security Council, in the form of a binding resolutions and coercive enforcement 
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measures,137 does not seem realistic, since Israel enjoys the support of the United States 
and every attempt to adopt similar resolutions would be likely vetoed. Accordingly, 
Israel will probably continue to ignore all the General Assembly recommendations.
Since common Article 1 of the Four Geneva Conventions provides that all the States 
must respect and ensure respect of the Conventions, all the States could invoke Israeli 
responsibilities and demand the cessation of the wrongful acts in case of serious 
violations, consistently with the erga omnes and erga omnes partes character of 
international humanitarian law norms.138 However, so far no State has complained 
specifically about the Dead Sea situation. 
Unfortunately, international law provides no satisfactory remedy against these 
violations, since currently there is not an international tribunal with jurisdiction over the 
wrongful acts committed by Israel on the Dead Sea shore. Even assuming that the State 
of Palestine will join the International Court of Justice’s Statute, the jus cogens and/or 
erga omnes character of the violated norms is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction 
of an international court, which requires the consent of all the States involved.139 It is 
even more unlikely that Israel will agree to settle any disputes about the Dead Sea shore 
voluntarily. 
Maybe the International Criminal Court would be the forum in which the issue of the 
Dead Sea exploitation would be addressed as a matter or individual criminal 
responsibility, but not the specific issue of denial of access. The International Court of 
Justice affirmed that the overexploitation of natural resources in an occupied territory 
constitutes pillage,140 one of the offences prosecuted according to the Rome Statute. In 
January 2015, the State of Palestine acceded to the Statute and its accession entered into 
force on 1 April 2015. Therefore, the State of Palestine can refer the situation of the 
West Bank, Dead Sea shore included, to the International Criminal Court and trigger an 
investigation and maybe the prosecution of the individuals responsible for the 
exploitation policy.141 However, such proceedings would not address the specific issue 
of the denial of access. 
In addition is unlikely the prosecution of individuals before domestic courts of member 
States to the Four Geneva Conventions142 since Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention does not include the overexploitation of natural resources into the so called 
137
 For an overview of the role of the Security Council in the enforcement of international humanitarian 
law, see Marco Roscini, The United Nations Security Council and the Enforcement of International 
Humanitarian Law, ILR 43 (2010), 330.
138
 Wall Opinion (note 10), para. 158. See also Luigi Condorelli/Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, 
Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des États de “respecter et faire respecter” le droit 
international humanitaire “en toutes circonstances”, in : Christophe Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays 
on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet (1984), 17.
139
 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), Judgment of 3 February 
2006, para. 64.
140
 Armed Activities Case (note 71), para 250. 
141
 This is the view of Al-Haq (note 8).
142
 This possibility has been envisaged by Imseis (note 29), 127 et seq.
29
‘grave breaches’. Moreover, many domestic legal systems have adopted restrictions to 
the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction.143
Finally, it is highly improbable that the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as High Court 
for the Israeli acts in the Palestinian Territory, would declare the illegality of the Israeli 
policy. From the examination of its case law, even in relation to the exploitation of 
natural resources,144 the Supreme Court appears reluctant to pass judgments against the 
Occupying Power, choosing to rely on proportionality tests that are in conflict with 
international humanitarian law in order to justify the violation of Palestinian rights.145  
In conclusion, the Israeli policy of denying access to the Dead Sea shore to Palestinian 
investors is unlawful under international law, Israel must put an end to it, and Palestine 
and maybe other States can invoke Israel’s responsibility, but at the moment there is no 
international court with direct jurisdiction over the issue. It is well-established in 
international law that the lack of a competent tribunal does not affect the legal content 
of the primary obligations of States,146 but it is clear that this is of scant consolation for 
the Palestinian State and people. 
On the contrary, the issue of the exploitation of the Palestinian Dead Sea shore can be 
addressed more appropriately in the wider context of the Israeli activities in the West 
Bank, particularly in relation to the settlements. The end of the occupation and the 
withdrawal of every settlement will obviously bring the Palestinians free access to their 
Dead Sea coastline, but this is not an easy achievement.
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